Saturday, October 1, 2011

Responding to critics: Prolegomena, Appendix

          In the appendix of the Prolegomina, Kant takes the chance to respond to some criticism thrown his way by the philosophers of his time. In the introduction, he is quick to make the distinction between two kinds of judgments on The Critique of Pure Reason; those that precede investigation, and those that come after the investigation. The focus of his response then becomes on the critique of one particular author, a Christian Garve, placing him in the category of authors who made the judgment preceding investigation. “He appears not at all to see what really mattered in the investigation with which I have occupied myself (p.124)”. Kant then continues to defend himself against his opponent’s view of him as a “transcendental idealist (p.125)” in a similar condescending manner for the rest of the response, which eventually leads him to the point he was trying to make: What can we do in order to make metaphysics as a science actual?
        
        Kant uses the criticism from Garve to point out its fallacy and incompetence in the sense that, unlike The Critique of Pure Reason, it does not even attempt to make a better case for metaphysics as a science. “The endeavors of all speculative philosophy now stand at the point of total dissolution, although human reason clings to them with undying (and betrayed) affection (p.131)”. His hope is that the Critique will at least be in some way helpful to the masses, that may come together in order analyze his work and re-examine the foundation upon which metaphysics stands at the time, “a system would thereby come into being that could become a legacy to posterity for which it would have reason to be thankful”. It seems as though Kant thinks he came up with the ultimate introduction tool, at the very least, to any system for metaphysics. On the one hand, he does pose some necessary questions for reason as being a priori, and the specific way one can approach the unfilled space of metaphysics in science, but is this a good defense for metaphysics or just an attempt to salvage his taken approach to it and the extensive arguments in the Critique? Are protection against “judgment(s) of dogmatic speculation (p.134)” and the search for the elementary concepts of the pure understanding strong enough rhetoric on his part to sway the criticisms from others in his favor?
      
       Kant takes on an arrogant tone in response to his criticisms from others, but is this tone justified by his work? Did the Prolegomina withstand the test of time as a system for metaphysics as Kant would have hoped?

2 comments:

  1. Kant’s Critique is not only allegedly useful as a tool for any examination of future metaphysics, but also (more importantly) wakes the field of metaphysics from its “dogmatic slumber.” Kant’s Prolegomena offers a fresh, non-dogmatic conclusion: “There will therefore be metaphysics in the world at every time, and what is more, in every human being, and especially the reflective ones; metaphysics that each, in the absence of a public standard of measure, will carve out for themselves in their own manner” [4:367]. Kant argues that the existence of metaphysics lies in the nature of human reason to seek completeness (p. xxx) and furthermore, can be individual based on what’s reasonable and thinkable to each person. The development of Kant’s system of knowledge or “special language,” which is critiqued as “merely verbal innovation” [4:376], seems to logically systematize speculative thought and allows Kant to reasonably conclude that metaphysical concepts, such as God and freedom, are never knowable, but only thinkable. Hence, Kant can argue that we cannot deny the existence of these concepts because they are thinkable, but cannot prove their existence since we can’t know things in themselves (Kant, unlike his predecessors, is not skeptical of things in themselves and believes that they do exist). Kant creates a disservice to dogmatic religions and even political regimes, but frees people to use their faculties of reason to dictate their own beliefs.

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  2. Kant is justified in his defense of Pure Reason...on the grounds that he has been able to prove his theory can work, at least in theory, and does have some meat to it. What better way to study what and how we really know things. Ego-trips aside Kant answers his critics I believe in the same language used by them. The bigger question is; can metaphysics remove man out of the haze of ignorance and dogmatic thinking and into “enlightenment”.
    In order to do this like any science metaphysics must have a structure or frame of thought in this case and that frame is reason alone. How reliable and how viable is this new science is shouldn’t be discarded on the grounds that it goes against convention but also that it tries to transcend natural law. For the idea of Metaphysics on a whole is to go beyond what is right in front of our faces and look at concepts that possible have more meaning than we can see outwardly.

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