Monday, October 17, 2011

Hegel's Notions of Truth and Consciousness

According to Hegel’s introduction to Phenomenology of Spirit, this is a question that cannot be so easily answered. We must first examine what is true in order to decipher what is false; they are interconnected in their existence. This idea was introduced in class when we discussed the concept of antithesis, in order to know what something is, is to know what it is not. The way in which he does this is by discussing the absolute and consciousness. In regards to the absolute, as Edward stated in his blog last week, “For Hegel, the Absolute exists as a kind of ultimate unity between life and reality and, more importantly, between the halves of each of the antithesis, such as between intellect and belief.” We will need to keep this definition in mind when discussing the role of consciousness in deciding between what is true and what is false.

As Hegel begins to discuss natural consciousness, he focuses on the idea of “doubt” and how it plays into understanding if knowledge is real or not. He states, “Natural consciousness will prove to be merely the concept of knowledge, that is, prove to be not real knowledge. However, because to a greater degree it immediately takes itself to be real knowledge , this path has a negative meaning for it, and in its eyes the realization of the concept will count to an even greater degree as the loss of itself, for it is on this path that it loses its truth” (37). Despite having read and re-read this section, the question that arises is how does it go about losing itself? Is Hegel stating that because it is on this path of self discovery that it somehow loses truth? Is truth and knowledge mutually exclusive? This is where his ideas of “doubt” start to come into play and where another curve ball is essentially thrown to the reader. As I understood it, doubt plays a significant role in proving the consciousness to be truth because in proving that doubt does not exist we are reassured of his truth. Hegel comes to this conclusion by saying, “In contrast, in directing itself to the entire range of phenomenal consciousness, skepticism makes spirit for the firs time competent to investigate what is the truth, since it manages to elicit a despair about those so-called natural conceptions, thoughts, and opinions” (38).

Taking all this into consideration, is it accurate to say that there are no absolute oppositions (or antithesis) when discussing the validity of consciousness and truth? If proving that something is false also proves that is it true or vice/verse do we lose sight of what the absolute truly is?

10 comments:

  1. Discussing “natural consciousness” losing itself when it discovers that it is “merely the concept of knowledge” (37), you ask if this means it somehow loses truth. I interpreted this section as Hegel commenting on the loss of the concept of self, or the truth of self. It seems to me he is talking about the loss of the ego, the subjective “I” of the consciousness, when it examines itself objectively. Is he not saying that when consciousness is both subject and object it then forms itself as the concept and brings its own restricted knowledge of itself into doubt?

    However, I wonder if I might not fully understand Hegel’s definition of the “natural consciousness.” His discussion of “the cultural maturation of consciousness” (38) leads me to believe that “natural consciousness” might contain forms of a shared historical consciousness comprised of accepted societal beliefs and “truths” handed down through the years from what he calls “the authority of others’ thoughts” (38); a sort-of unconscious conventional consciousness that remains unexamined by the individual self.

    Hegel then goes on to mention "unreal consciousness" (38). What are Hegel's definitions of these differing specific forms of "natural" and "unreal" consciousness?

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  3. I feel as if truth for Hegel is the absolute; therefore everything which is not the absolute is essentially the antithesis of truth. The same can be said for consciousness. Since consciousness is, in Hegel’s account, always striving towards the absolute, then it is not truth/the absolute. Therefore consciousness could be understood as an antithesis of truth. Truth could be seen as the antithesis of consciousness. When we prove something to be false, we have a greater understanding of what may be the truth. We are a set closer to the absolute with each refinement of knowledge and consciousness. We move closer to the absolute and the truth with every statement or condition that we prove false.

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  4. I was/am confused about what Hegel meant by consciousness, concept and cognition. The quote you selected helped me attempt to make it clear in my mind (still blurry) between the three. To answer your question about “losing itself,” I think it losses itself because Natural Consciousness will get confused thinking it is done developing (it will despair) when in fact, in it’s present state, is not real as it is because it will become afraid, ¶ 80 Hegel states: “the fear of truth may lead consciousness to conceal itself both from itself and from others,” and hence it will not continue to develop its form and shapes.

    The goal is to become whole, hence the Absolute Truth is the whole. So far, it is my understanding that the cognition has consciousness and it (not sure how or were the concept fits); but the cognition forms appearances in correspondence and in relation to the object. [¶ 74 Hegel states: “representations of cognition as an instrument and as a medium, and it also presupposes a distinction between ourselves and this cognition”] This is done internally and systematic. Therefore, Truth is the sum of internal relations. Absolute Truth will become whole when “the concept corresponds to the object and the object to the concept” and not stop and will go beyond its “immediate existence” until it satisfies itself. (¶ 80 p. 3rd sentence). And I think this will happen when it finally, consciously (I now think that consciousness maybe the same as concepts at ¶ 80 Hegel wrote: “consciousness is for itself its concept”) forms from itself concepts which become cognize in itself. In other words when it knows and satisfies Self it will become whole and reach Truth.

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  5. I agree with Linna about being confused on this entire concept, object, cognition, consciousness, and many other terms. After reading what was posted, I got a little better understanding on these terms that they are all related and depended on one another in some way as Hegel called it mediation. When I hear about consciousness, I see it as one's feeling on its own existence, sensations, thoughts, and surroundings. This consciousness determines what is true and what is false by what they experienced and their knowledge of knowing the nature world.
    As I also agree with Hegel about teleological, which means that everything has an end and has a purpose after it. As we see about the past and the history of philosophy, there’s always a reason of what is being done and what it comes out with all the consciousness and the concept of knowledge.

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  6. When reading the introduction to Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, I too become confused with many of the terms he uses since they oppose modern, "common-sense" notions. I think it is helpful to first understand Hegel's definitions of “consciousness” and “natural.” Hegel defines consciousness as “something from itself and at the same time relates itself to it” (¶82). In other words, consciousness is both knowing the subjects (i.e. the I or the self) and the relationship between the subject and its objects. Bryan makes a good analysis of what Hegel refers to as “natural consciousness.” Initially to us, the word natural seems to imply some sort of biological or physical association. On the contrary, Hegel’s use of “natural” is unconnected to the physical world and seems to refer to something presupposed, for example our beliefs of the world shaped by culture and history. He argues that these natural conceptions “burden” the consciousness from investigating the truth/ itself (the truth being found within consciousness ¶85).

    From my understanding of ¶78, I agree with many of the previous posts that the “path of despair” is consciousness being shaped and formed via “cultural maturation” or societal “authority.” These cultural or presupposed beliefs are what Descartes may refer to as “self-evident” truths, which Hegel must oppose since he believes everything is in relation and there cannot exist any stand-alone truths. Hegel argues that if conscious becomes aware of itself, it can transcend its prejudices and beliefs and find rationality/ truth. Again, in order to investigate truth, Hegel argues it lies within consciousness and arises from examining itself. Hegel proposes how one’s consciousness can become liberated by engaging in the dialectic in ¶86… which will be a good discussion for later posts.

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  7. I am also having a hard time grasping some of the concepts Hegel presents. Mostly because he uses a lot of terms to explain his ideas but to me it seems like each term has multiple meanings. One example of this is when he uses the term Notion. From my understanding Notion was sort of the essence of an object, or what it generally stood for but not absolute. However in section 84 he goes on about how you can designate knowledge to Notion but also call the essence of the object the Notion as well. Hegel says that these are both the same thing but to me Knowledge is something different from essence. It just gets very confusing for me while reading when there are so many terms but they all tend to mush together at certain points.

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  8. This post is in response to Chris’ post about notion / knowledge and essence, and §84 of the Introduction. In §84, Hegel begins to describe how one’s notions, that is, their knowledge of an object, corresponds to the essence, or truth, of an object by way of comparison. That is to say that one can form a concept about an object, and then attempt to see whether or not the essence of that object matches the concept previously formed, or, an object can cause a concept to be formed within our consciousness, causing its essence to, in a manner, merge with its concept. If this latter explanation is assumed, we still must compare the object with the concept formed by itself within our consciousness. Thus, the entirety of §84 is Hegel attempting to dissuade us from paying any attention to whether or not we form a concept and apply it to an object (as in Kant) or whether or not objects form concepts within our consciousnesses, as, to Hegel, this is just a waste of our time and directs us away from the matter at hand.

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  9. The key point to remember about Hegel is that he believes that all things are in relation. In that sense, there is definitely an opposition (antithesis) to the Truth. All things one can label as untrue are the antithesis to the Truth. Remember, to understand what is “A”, one must know what is “~A” and be able to distinguish the properties unique to each respective side. As Maria notes, Hegel’s account of doubt is a method in affirming the “what is” and the “what is not”, but more importantly, doubt is the very first step in convincing one to hold one’s beliefs to the light for truth examination. Hegel equates doubt with the sort of self-consummating skepticism that does not merely doubt all things but rather it doubts for the sake of finding the True. In that sense, Hegel’s Path of Doubt/Despair is also, in a way, a Path of True Understanding. As Hegel notes, “the path is the conscious insight into the untruth of phenomenal knowledge, for which the most real is in truth merely the unrealized concept” (38). As earlier stated, by knowing “what is not” is also at the same time knowing “what is”.

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  10. In terms of finding what Hegel can consider one to know with surety, knowing what something is not (as mentioned in previous comments) is what seems to be the closest to fitting that criterion. The variable that should not be forgotten, though, is that when one goes through an "experience" as Hegel calls it, they become better informed about what exists. If one's understanding of an object is used as an example, a person finds what was thought to be a true concept to be false and what was thought to be false to be the concept. This may call into question the idea of knowing what is not to be the case to be undeniably not the case.

    I may only be differing from previous comments semantically.

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