In the present essay, Kant describes the age in which he lives as "an age of enlightenment". It is one in which individuals are learning to use their faculty of reason to make decisions involving religion, morality, ethics and good government... without relying on so-called "experts" to provide them with answers. Kant labels the latter condition as one of "immaturity", and defines it as "the inability to use one's own understanding without the guidance of another" [page 54].
Kant's essay is best viewed as a polemic, directed at his king and others in authority, arguing as he does that while private use of reason can and often should be restricted, public use of reason must always be given free rein... if the goal of those in authority is that society achieve its highest potential [page 55]. By "public use of reason", Kant means that process by which the thoughts and views of learned and informed individuals are promulgated throughout society by means of scholarly writings and public discourse. He terms "private use of reason" that which a person might employ in carrying out his duties within a particular post or office to which he has been entrusted [last line, page 55].
Kant believes that any suppression of public free thinking must, inevitably, have a detrimental and pernicious effect on society by keeping it, at best, in a state of "immaturity" and, at worst, in a state of "barbarism". And Kant adds that "matters of religion" represent the most critical sphere in which public use of reason and individual free thought must be given free rein [page 59].
How do these admonitions of Kant relate to his views on metaphysics, as elaborated in his Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics ?... And, in particular, how can its sub-discipline, religion, have the potential to become a more "enlightened" field of inquiry and endeavor over time? For Kant's present essay on "Enlightenment" to make any sense at all, vis-à-vis the possibility of there being "enlightenment in religion", it is necessary to assume that at least one of the following must be true:
A. That metaphysics, insofar as spiritual and religious matters are concerned, is a science that can make progress and become "more enlightened" over time by adding to its store of "a priori synthetic knowledge", brought about by public use of reason in scholarly discourse.
B. That human happiness and societal contentment will be enhanced through "more enlightened" forms of religious belief and practice, and will be diminished through "less enlightened forms"... and that, over time, through free public discourse based on public use of reason, the better forms of religious belief and practice will become predominant, allowing religious belief to make progress as a "social science".
C. That since "absolute truth" with respect to proper religious belief and practice can never be known, given the limits of metaphysical inquiry, the free exchange of ideas regarding religion by means of public use of reason, nonetheless, represents a desirable "end in itself"... always preferable to the maintenance of a fixed, unquestionable body of religious dogmatism. One might ask, though, whether this last position is inherently obvious... or needs to be supported by means of logically sound arguments.
In conclusion, it is noteworthy that aside from drawing the distinction between public and private uses of reason, Kant notes that, unlike in the case of public use of reason... private use of reason must often be curtailed. He states that, "a lesser degree of civil freedom gives intellectual freedom enough room to expand to its fullest content" [page 59]. In other words, one must often do one's duty as an agent of society and, in so doing, further an idea or enterprise that is in direct opposition to one's own standards of sound logic and reasonableness. For example, the editor of a newspaper or scholarly journal might have an obligation to print a well-framed article, even though he might believe that the contents of the article are false and counter-productive. By curbing his own private use of reason and allowing the article to be published, he allows the general public to see the contents and decide for itself... thereby allowing public use of reason to have its largest audience and its greatest impact.
How do these admonitions of Kant relate to his views on metaphysics, as elaborated in his Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics ?... And, in particular, how can its sub-discipline, religion, have the potential to become a more "enlightened" field of inquiry and endeavor over time? For Kant's present essay on "Enlightenment" to make any sense at all, vis-à-vis the possibility of there being "enlightenment in religion", it is necessary to assume that at least one of the following must be true:
A. That metaphysics, insofar as spiritual and religious matters are concerned, is a science that can make progress and become "more enlightened" over time by adding to its store of "a priori synthetic knowledge", brought about by public use of reason in scholarly discourse.
B. That human happiness and societal contentment will be enhanced through "more enlightened" forms of religious belief and practice, and will be diminished through "less enlightened forms"... and that, over time, through free public discourse based on public use of reason, the better forms of religious belief and practice will become predominant, allowing religious belief to make progress as a "social science".
C. That since "absolute truth" with respect to proper religious belief and practice can never be known, given the limits of metaphysical inquiry, the free exchange of ideas regarding religion by means of public use of reason, nonetheless, represents a desirable "end in itself"... always preferable to the maintenance of a fixed, unquestionable body of religious dogmatism. One might ask, though, whether this last position is inherently obvious... or needs to be supported by means of logically sound arguments.
In conclusion, it is noteworthy that aside from drawing the distinction between public and private uses of reason, Kant notes that, unlike in the case of public use of reason... private use of reason must often be curtailed. He states that, "a lesser degree of civil freedom gives intellectual freedom enough room to expand to its fullest content" [page 59]. In other words, one must often do one's duty as an agent of society and, in so doing, further an idea or enterprise that is in direct opposition to one's own standards of sound logic and reasonableness. For example, the editor of a newspaper or scholarly journal might have an obligation to print a well-framed article, even though he might believe that the contents of the article are false and counter-productive. By curbing his own private use of reason and allowing the article to be published, he allows the general public to see the contents and decide for itself... thereby allowing public use of reason to have its largest audience and its greatest impact.
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ReplyDelete"For example, the editor of a newspaper or scholarly journal might have an obligation to print a well-framed article, even though he might believe that the contents of the article are false and counter-productive. By curbing his own private use of reason and allowing the article to be published, he allows the general public to see the contents and decide for itself... thereby allowing public use of reason to have its largest audience and its greatest impact."
ReplyDeleteIf the editor has an obligation, as demanded by her job position, to print such an article despite her person opinion regarding the content of the article, she is not curbing her own private use of reason as Kant defines it, but practicing her private use of reason by obeying that which is demanded of her by her job position. One often thinks of “public” as that which is related to public conduct while “private” as an internal process which includes our “conscience”, but that usage is not exactly what Kant had in mind when he talks about “public” and “private” reason. Kant isn’t using “public reason” to refer to an obligation to obey the rules; following that obligation requires “private reason”. By “public use of reason”, Kant is referring to the exercise of reason in the public exchange of words. It is not difficult to see what is so “public” about exercising your reason and expressing it through writing/speech regardless of what the authority of your time claims as truth when we see ourselves as creatures whose experiences, world-views, identities, meaning, reside in a historical context; we are constituted by words/ideas which did not spontaneously spring about from a vacuum but was passed down from earlier thinkers. Thus it is through having this (public) dialogue revolutions of ideas occurs, and revolutions of ideas bring about revolutions in actions and structures, so this is pretty serious stuff.
Although it may seem like a minor point, I believe it is important to point out that Immanuel Kant was in good relations with the King of Prussia (Frederick II (the Great)) at the time of writing “What is Enlightenment?” Norm wrote: “directed at his king and others in authority, arguing as he does that while private use of reason can and often should be restricted, public use of reason must always be given free rein... if the goal of those in authority is that society achieve its highest potential [page 55]”. I feel as though it wasn’t directed at his King in a condescending tone. I believe it was directed at Kings in other nation-states. Frederick II is known by many as the ‘Philosopher King’. From a young age, unlike his father, Frederick-Wilhelm I, Frederick II was a staunch supporter of philosophical discourse and an educated society. Many writers and philosophers, such as Voltaire, were housed in his summer palace, Sanssouci. He had liberalized the media during his reign, in hopes that the populous would engage in discourse.
ReplyDeleteFirst of all, JHarden, thank you for sharing your knowledge of King Frederick. I was wondering whom this Frederick was that Kant mentioned, but had yet to find the time to do my research. Your post really helps to put things in a historical context. (And it also gives me further insight into Rufus Wainwright’s song, “Sanssouci.”)
ReplyDeleteSecondly, Ethan, I think you have cleared up an important distinction between the private and public use of reason. Although, I still wonder how much “freedom” persons in certain occupations actually have to exercise their public use of reason through a “public exchange of words,” be it in Kant’s time or our own. Kant says that “a clergyman is bound to instruct his pupils and his congregation in accordance with the doctrines of the church he serves,” but he is free in his public use of reason to “impart on the public” his criticisms of these doctrines (56). I don’t see how he could publicly criticize without retribution from the church and the possible loss of his job. Much in the same way, a journalist today may report stories without inclusion of his opinion or bias, but when he publicly voices his personal opinion he will also risk reprimand from his employer. It seems to me that with some occupations your private use of reason does not stop when you are “off the clock” and, therefore, the only true freedom to employ your public use of reason must be done anonymously.
According to Kant individuals become mature (when they get off their buts and stop being lazy) they examine their own beliefs and values and through an ability to understand themselves they act in accordance with their will/duty as their role in public. It is difficult for an individual to be free to develop it’s maturity when they are employed by an institution. Kant refers to this a private. An example of someone who is employed by a private institution is a clergy. Being in a private setting can be a restriction to excise freedom and become mature. The individual’s own reason is restricted in the sense that the person is not able to do his own will but must follow rules and, in the case of clergy, rituals. Hence they are not free. To be free and become mature individuals ought to “think for themselves” (p. 55) and be able to ask question and come to their own mature understanding. Immaturity can be overcome wherein literate individuals, by way of a public movement, exchange their views in written form. However, Kant states that, it is with the individual itself to become mature, as the public moves slowly to maturity and further the public “will never produce a true reform in ways of thinking.” (p. 55)
ReplyDeleteKant’s admonitions to his views on metaphysics are related in that he expresses a need/necessity of individuals to think for themselves and therefore to questions their own reason; but obey and act according to duty civility.
As briefly mentioned toward the end of class yesterday, certain very public offices, due to their nature, can place very restrictive rules upon one’s ability to add to the public discourse through one’s public use of reason. The case of General McChrystal’s remarks to a Rolling Stone reporter is a good example of this. As a result of his position, the restrictions placed on his private use of reason necessarily, and for good cause, extend to also cover the use of his public reason in many capacities. As Bryan pointed out, in instances such as these it would seem that the only way for one to exercise one’s free use of public reason would be to do so anonymously. This idea seems to be supported by what Kant says on page 56, “he [the military officer] cannot reasonably be banned from making observations as a man of learning on the errors in the military service, and from submitting these to his public for judgement.” In certain situations it is entirely unreasonable to be able to freely use one’s public reason. After all, an idea, once promoted in the public discourse, can always be picked up and carried further on by others in the position to do so. While name recognition, as it were, can certainly help it is not required for the advancement of society.
ReplyDeleteI think that all three of your conditions for how the Prolegomena makes sense in terms of "enlightenment in religion" are applicable here, although it almost seems strange to see Kant
ReplyDeleteapply those ideas in such a broad political way. I say "strange" but I think I mean disappointing--Kant, in this essay, begins to sound like an apologist--although he makes radical contributions to philosophical inquiry, he also tries to defend the status quo with those same conclusions. Where in other areas (like ethics) he proposes somewhat radical practical applications of his work,
in areas of religion and politics he seems to twist his meaning to suit the powers that be. I would need to know a lot more about is practical philosophy to say this for certain, but, for example, I would think that his application of Prolegomena ideas in the Categorical Imperative would necessarily come into conflict with this idea of "private use of reason"...
I also believe that all three of your ideas can work with what Kant is trying to say, but I most agree with "A". The reason being that his definitions of private and public use of reason ties well into his aspect on religion and metaphysics existence. I agree with you Norm that Kant identifies the possibility that religion can progress and be a science through the public use of reason.
ReplyDeleteBut I also think that this is how Kant sees the only way possible for metaphysics to progress into an actual science. If people write about their view of metaphysics in so that other people can accept and add or refute that opinion, then metaphysics will start to build ground as a science.
"A. That metaphysics, insofar as spiritual and religious matters are concerned, is a science that can make progress and become "more enlightened" over time by adding to its store of "a priori synthetic knowledge", brought about by public use of reason in scholarly discourse."
ReplyDeleteIn my opinion point A is not true according to Kant. Enlightenment is to learn to use of your own understanding without the help of so called "experts", so the use of public knowledge can't lead to enlightenment in religion since that is the opposite of enlightenment, that is said to be immaturity. Kant says that using the guidance of another is being "immature". I do believe that religion can progress and become enlightened through "public use of reason", which is when thoughts of people with knowledge are spread through writings. Knowledge needs to be shared between people to become greater and better ideas to become developed.
“Public use of reason” in the simplest terms, is the sharing of one’s thoughts regarding a certain subject using media society. Through free speech, one’s words and thought may possibly inspire those who are currently “immature” to think and speak for themselves. Kant defines “immaturity” as “the inability to use one’s own understanding without the guidance of another” (pg.54). It would seem, then, that anyone who speaks their minds on things they claim to understand is thus “enlightened”. However, there seems to be no practicality to this form of enlightenment because where there is thought, there is a disagreement. Though it may be wonderful for people to spread their knowledge and to speak freely, would there not be another person out their who’s free speech will contradict another’s? In moral philosophy, Kant’s Categorical Imperative and Mill’s Utilitarianism are both widely discussed theories and both individuals are thought of as highly intelligent. Yet their thoughts and beliefs highly contradict one another’s. There seems to be no universality in thoughts and that creates conflicts. Unless there is absolute agreement on things such as mathematics, then Kant’s “enlightenment” really does not mean much.
ReplyDeleteIn respect to Chris' comment on proposition A it does not seem that Norm was suggesting that a dependence on experts is necessary. I also do not think that Kant was condemning listening to experts, but instead calling for individuals to question and verify the findings of experts. It would be impractical for the sake of progression for individuals to go through the process of discovering all knowledge as oppose to criticizing the current pool of knowledge.
ReplyDeleteIn a separate note, I may be missing Norm's point in proposition B, but I would assume that Kant does not think the end of religious belief and practice would be an enhancement of "human happiness and societal contentment". Happiness and contentment are not deciding factors when it comes to duty so, although I do not have the evidence for this, I assume that duty is the completion of another, perhaps higher, end than happiness and contentment.
Kant wants us to use enlightenment as a public goal. I believe that is why his public and private uses of reason are different from how we think of them. He wants the student to listen to the teacher, the armed soldier to listen to his sergeant, and the citizen to listen to the officer regardless of what our opinions may be. Why? To keep the peace. Norm is correct in his conclusion that we must use our private use of reason to make way for others to use their public use of reason. By allowing this room, more people will be inclined to write letters and spread their ideas. This is the only way to reach that public goal of enlightenment.
ReplyDeletePart 1 (of 2)
ReplyDeleteI want to thank everyone who has commented so far for their very thoughtful insights... and to add a few comments of my own!
1. To Ethan -- Yes, I agree with how you... and Professor Vaught... have defined these terms. It would have been better if I had said that the editor of the newspaper must restrict his/her private use of reason to accord with the official dictates of the position... and must curb any tendency to include personal views that might conflict with it.
2. To JHarden -- Yes, I agree that the policies of "Frederick the Great" did not create much difficulty for Kant with respect to censorship. But I wrote "king" with a lower-case "k" to include any individual who might assume the position of monarch at a later time. In fact, Frederick II died just two years after the publication of this essay, and his successor, Frederick William II did, in fact, considerably tighten up on censorship following the French Revolution of 1789. For several years Kant was banned from publishing ANYTHING on religion... and he had to wait until a new monarch ascended the throne before he could return to that topic.
3. To Bryan and Edward Verdecanna -- I agree with you as well. General McChrystal's dismissal was mentioned by Professor Vaught in class as an example of a clash between public and private uses of reason After he got into trouble for candidly expressing his opinions regarding conduct of the war in Afghanistan, it was pointed out that although he had publicly DISAGREED with the policies of his commander-in-chief, at no time had he ever failed to CARRY OUT ORDERS regarding implementation of the president's policies. In other words, although he made proper "private use of reason" with respect to his job as general, it was felt that the nature of that position put a restriction on his "public use of reason". Kant is not particularly clear within the several examples he gives as to when the duties implied in private use of reason place restrictions on public use of reason [pages 56-7].
4. To Linna -- But Kant believes that it's INEVITABLE that at least some of the "guardians" (e.g. CLERGY in the field of religion), will learn to think freely and will encourage their charges to think for themselves as well [page 55].
Part 2 (of 2)
ReplyDelete5. To JonPerry, Ethan and TLoughlin -- I referred to Kant's essay as a "polemic" (and Jon calls him "an apologist") because he is one-sidedly arguing a position from which he stands to benefit... namely, that his writings should not be censored because they will NEVER have a detrimental effect on society by encouraging others to disobey. But, of course, this might NOT always be true! I would say that it's INEVITABLE that the ideas expressed in "public use of reason" will, sooner or later (and probably sooner!) filter down into "private use of reason", and perhaps result in civil disobedience. Only the despotism of an absolute monarch or tyrant could prevent that from happening. In fact, Kant reminded King Frederick II that he had "a well-disciplined and numerous army" at his beck-and-call [page 59] to allay any fear the king might harbor of "ivory-tower intellectuals" wreaking havoc upon society. But the pen is usually, in fact, MIGHTIER than the sword! As an example, one can recall the institution of slavery in the United States. Not only was it legal, but actually written into the US Constitution. But because of the "public use of reason" transmitted by an influential group of abolitionist writers, private use of reason, which required that individuals return escaped slaves to their owners, underwent a change.
6. To Jennifer S., Chris and Brett -- But since Kant believes that it's IMPOSSIBLE to prove or disapprove the existence of G-d, the soul, or the afterlife... it's hard for me to see how religion as theology could make any progress similar to that of physics, chemistry or biology. I tend to feel that he is equating "enlightenment" in religion with a pluralistic and tolerant society... where people are free to frame their own beliefs in accordance with the establishment of their own "categorical imperatives". And I agree with Brett that giving a certain amount of WEIGHT to the opinions of those who are very learned in a field is not a sign of immaturity, but rather one of maturity, as long as the expert opinion is merely used as an aid in forming one's own opinion.
7. To Brett -- I agree with you that Kant probably did not have my "proposition B" in mind, given that "duty" would likely be linked to theology for him. However, I'm thinking that, from our CONTEMPORARY point of view, we tend to judge religion as "enlightened" only when it tends to contribute to the optimism, well-being, peace-of-mind and harmonious living of its adherents within the "here-and-now". And Kant's countryman, Max Weber, wrote a very influential book about 100 years after Kant called The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, in which he argued that Calvinism was a SUPERIOR ("more enlightened"?) form of religion to Roman Catholoicism because it tended to foster the accumulation of material wealth within a society. This is another example of viewing religion through the prism of social science.
8. To Kevin -- I agree with you, which is why I remarked in my "proposition C" that Kant's approbation of independence, pluralism and diversity with respect to religious thought might need to be defended through argument. As "devil's advocate", I might pose this question: "Does one DOGMATIC body of religious belief... propounded as ABSOLUTELY TRUE FOR ALL TIME (which Kant explicitly labels as "a crime against human nature..." [page 57]) not work to foster a more cohesive society, make religious wars within that society less likely and make it far more likely that the moral and ethical tenets of the religion will be adhered to very scrupulously as a matter of course?.....