More on "What is Enlightenment?"

Hey there, I thought I’d say a few more words about “What is Enlightenment?” since we only spent a single day on it (and also because I just had more to say). I want to thank Norm for this excellent, provocative post on the essay.  He has both clarified the text itself as well as raised important questions, that due to our schedule, I will not be able to answer in class. I am particularly glad that he ventured to answer the question regarding the relation of metaphysics to Enlightenment.

Although there are many great comments here I will for brevity’s sake respond to a couple. Ethan’s clarification is very helpful and amplifies beneficially what I was saying in class on Wednesday. As well, I appreciate John’s comment about Frederick the Great. I strongly agree that Kant’s text is not a polemic—if anything it’s more of a Festschrift, a celebratory writing, devoted to a Frederick (in this respect, Jon P is closer to the truth … Kant does sound a bit sycophantic). For examples of polemics, see his comments on his reviewers in the Appendix to the Prolegomena. But in 18th century Prussia, no one raises polemics against the king.

Metaphysics and Enlightenment

First, we must remember that Kant in the Prolegomena asks after the possibility of metaphysics as a science.  He has strict rules for what a science is and despite his passionate devotion to metaphysics, he applies them carefully and without immoderate generosity. But public discourse cannot satisfy those rules, of establishing a foundation that is “permanent” and “complete” because the concerns of public discourse are not scientific. They concern matters of public concern that are revisable, civil laws and practices—but for metaphysics to be a science, it cannot be revisable.

Second, the ends of Enlightenment and philosophy as metaphysics are different. Metaphysics needs to be established as a science, whereas Enlightenment takes its aim as the liberation of individuals’ reason from the hegemony of institutions.

Writing and Civil Law

This is the most interesting issue, namely, the unique status of writing in relation to civil law. First, there is the perplexing fact that Kant simply identifies writing with intellectual freedom. This seems contrary to fact, in that in Prussia (at least after Frederick the Great and likely before him, if not during his rule) texts were always submitted to a censor before publication. Thus, far from intellectual freedom, writing seems to be the place in which certain constraints are placed on intellectual life. This is also contrary to tradition, in that philosophical history consistently derogated writing as a “dead” representation of thought, as Plato put it in the Phaedrus. Thus, reason would seem not constrained in this perspective, but neutralized.

Second, intellectual freedom is most extended where civil freedoms are curtailed. What Kant means by this is that where human action is more limited, the mind can act more freely. It may appear as if he is saying the opposite of this, but a closer examination reveals otherwise.

“A high degree of civil freedom seems advantageous to a people’s intellectual freedom, yet it also sets up insuperable barriers to it. Conversely, a lesser degree of civil freedom gives intellectual freedom the room to expand to its full extent” (59). It seems like the greater the field of human action, intellectual freedom would equally benefit. Yet some “insuperable barriers” are erected, and intellectual freedom is actually liberated more though a more limited sphere of human action. What these “insuperable barriers” are, I will not speculate here. The question is, how do limits on public action benefit literary culture and intellectual freedom?  Where the actions of bodies and individuals are most closely circumscribed, the mind gains a freedom from its guidance of the former?

Third, why does public speech, not writing, threaten civil peace? Freedom of speech is allowed, only insofar as individuals are publishing themselves, rather than vocalizing themselves. The sphere of public reason is delimited, as I indicated above. Johann the Blacksmith and Gottfried the Miller are not privy to the discourse of “scholars.” Since they may well be illiterate, does public reason, when vocalized, provoke the illiterate to disrupt civil law?  Whereas “scholars” can respect the space of writing, in which thoughts are expressed without immediate civil consequences? Is spoken public reason (if this were possible) closer to civil action than written public reason?