For Hegel, the need for philosophy (though not philosophy itself) arises as a contingent from what he calls the, “harmony that has been rent” (40). This destroyed harmony is referred throughout the piece as the dichotomy between what Hegel calls the Absolute and the “appearance of the Absolute” (40). It is man’s intellect and its suppression and/or misappropriation of Reason that causes this dichotomy to appear. In particular, it is intellect’s insistence on the fixed that interferes with the unfixed and infinite portions of what Hegel refers to as the “antitheses,” i.e., “spirit and matter, soul and body, faith and intellect, freedom and necessity, etc.” (41). In the place of these traditional antitheses appears new antitheses, such as, “Reason and sensibility,” and, “absolute subjectivity and absolute objectivity” (41). In fact, the nature of intellect itself could be considered another such antithesis, if one considers that intellect has an ever expanding purview in the interest of linking the Absolute to human experience, creating an ever more complex manifold in an attempt to gain an understanding of the Absolute (40). It is the fixing of these antitheses and, in particular, the moving away from the older generation of them, that produces Reason’s need of philosophy.
In order to better understand Hegel’s task, we should closely examine what he means by the Absolute. An early reference is made to the fixation of the Absolute into appearance and, in this manner, one may immediately think of the distinction made by Kant between things in themselves and appearance. It would be a mistake, however, to stop there as Kant further separates appearance from illusion and Hegel does not appear to do the same. For Hegel, the Absolute exists as a kind of ultimate unity between life and reality and, more importantly, between the halves of each of the antithesis, such as between intellect and belief. Life, itself, is a product of both unity and fission and it “eternally forms itself by setting up oppositions” (41). To understand the nature of the Absolute is to understand that these seemingly contradictory concepts can and must coexist.
As one becomes able to move beyond thinking of these halves in a fixed nature, as intellect would have us often do, culture and society can begin to deconstruct intellect’s ever expanding and solidifying manifold and see the complementary nature of the apparent contradictions of each antithesis. This presents us with a question. Does the solving of this dichotomy eliminate the need of philosophy? Or will it continue in some fashion, finding for itself a new reason for being?
I took Hegel to mean that the need for philosophy stems from its divisions. It’s main foundation or cause being dichotomy. In the beginning of this reading Hegel states, “Dichotomy is the source of the need of philosophy” and not “harmony that has been rent.”
ReplyDeleteTo answer your question – I think that each generation in time and space will grapple with their own questions. As long as there are thinking minds, in the world, they (the minds) will always get busy with utilizing their reason to think and wonder. That’s what the mind does. It needs to reason. And every generation will give it their own fancy names in an attempt to define that which they can not explain. Some call it Divine Being, Spirit, Soul, God, Brahmin, Alah; Kant calls it, “The Thing in Itself”, and there are many other names given, in an attempt to explain, the unexplainable. The important thing, that I agree with Kant, is for each individual to take the time to know Self (their own self) and take responsibility for their relationship to the world.
What I had found most perplexing about Hegel’s work is that he uses many terms that he does not define (e.g., Reason, intellect, reflection and the Absolute) and this blog has been helpful in clearing up that confusion for me. Although these are certainly terms that have been used by other philosophers prior to him, I feel as if Hegel is using them in a different way. Perhaps he defines them elsewhere and readers familiar with his philosophical works may not be as puzzled by them, but their use is certainly perplexing to those that are just being exposed to Hegel’s philosophy.
ReplyDeleteThus, impacted by Kant’s terminology, I was also instantly reminded of the distinction between appearances and things at the beginning of the reading: “In any culture, the appearance of the Absolute has become isolated from the Absolute and fixated into independence. But at the same time the appearance cannot disown its origin, and must aim to constitute the manifold of its limitations into one whole” (40). The last part of this statement indicates that what Hegel means by “appearance of the Absolute” and “the Absolute” is probably not the same thing as what Kant means by “appearance” and “the thing in itself.” Nevertheless, having been just recently exposed to Kant’s terminology, it is quite difficult to let go of that distinction and to understand that Hegel means by his distinction, and consequently, what he means by the Absolute. Regarding this, I have found Edward’s explanation of the Absolute (i.e., it being the “ultimate unity between life and reality and, more importantly, between the halves of each of the antithesis”) to be extremely helpful.
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