Friday, October 14, 2011

Hegel's Confines of a Natural Life

In Hegel's introduction to The Phenomenology of Spirit, he outlines his reasoning behind the nature of consciousness. In this exposition, he stops along the way to expand on the logical effects of his conclusions. One such segment is in section 80, sentences three through five:
“What is limited to a natural life is not on its own capable of going beyond its immediate existence. However, it is driven out of itself by something other than itself, and this being torn out of itself is its death. However, consciousness is for itself its concept, and as a result it immediately goes beyond the restriction, and, since this restriction belongs to itself, it goes beyond itself too.”
Even with pages of writing surrounding this segment, these sentences prove to be somewhat cryptic and difficult to unravel. This portion is difficulty because it is amidst seemingly contradictory writing, but, in this way, it also proves its importance. Thus far, consciousness is subject to its limited knowledge. It seems as though it is passively existing and only changing when it happens upon an experience that is contradictory to its prior conceptions. The excerpt confronts and adds to this way of thinking.
The first sentence references “natural life” (39). This natural life that Hegel refers to is the life that one perceives to be the true life that they are part of. In this way “Natural consciousness...immediately takes itself to be real knowledge” (37). The problem with this knowledge is that it is not true knowledge. One will continually find that the natural knowledge they assume to be true to be, in fact, ill informed and requiring adjustment. A natural life is one that functions solely on the presumption that its natural knowledge is flawless, and in this way it cannot go “beyond its own existence” to see that their knowledge is flawed and merely a direct effect of perception (39).
The second sentence references consciousness being “driven out” of this natural life “by something other than itself” (39). The question is inevitably raised of why should one be driven out of natural life to begin with? Using Hegel's terminology, it is to reach the Absolute. In more common terminology it could be to become enlightened. Perhaps a common thread could be strung here between Hegel and The Allegory of The Cave where, in each instance, something external drives the subject to enlightenment. The end of the sentence where this process for consciousness, “is its death” appropriately follows the current construct is being overturned and thrown out (39).
The third sentence neatly ties this excerpt together by application. The concept referenced here is explicated in a later section to be the object under examination “for an other” (40). Put more simply, a concept is the understood state of an object as perceived by a consciousness. So, in this scenario, the consciousness is defined by itself in the form of a concept. But, how can one go beyond their own consciousness? The concept of consciousness prior to the process stated here is one of inadvertent limitation; an unawareness of the possibility for metacognition in a sense. Once this process of understanding a greater ability, and thus breaking the prior confines and limitations, is applied then it is possible that it “goes beyond itself” (39). This excerpt opens the door to a new type of awareness in Hegel's writing. The possibility to exceed ignorance by an understanding of ignorance.

Although this seems to be a fine explanation of how consciousness breaks itself out of its own confines, is it correct to say that this is the doing of consciousness if it is something else that is driving consciousness out of its prior state?

3 comments:

  1. Hegel reasoning for the nature of consciousness in this passage relies on the view that in order to acquire a self concept, the consciousness must encounter something else, which indeed tears it out of its original state. I'm not totally convinced by this reasoning, precisely that to know A, we must know a -A that reestablishes the A. On the one hand, recalling the example of the Master and Slave as being discrete states, there is a view that one cannot be a Master if there is no Slave to give the Master his status. On the other hand, the Master should still retain his status as such because he is already in that state, it's simply a matter of a lacking a subordinate other at the present time that leaves his status unrecognized.
    Thus, I cannot fully agree that encountering the other leaves the original consciousness to the only choice of death, followed by reconstitution into something more aware. The original building block of consciousness will remain intact, it will simply be given another floor build itself upon.

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  2. As confusing as the introduction to The Phenomenology of Spirit is , I think Bret did a great job of breaking it down line by line. After reading the segment a few times I must conclude that Hegel was trying to separate power of consciousness and limitations of natural existence but at the same time sounding contradictory, in that obviously you cannot have one with out the other. If natural life has its limits, how can consciuosness not fall into the same boat I wonder. On a temporal/physical scale we all have a limit to our time on earth as well as our intelligence and ability to rationalize, though our consciousness as Hegel decribes is limitless. it being a concept and not a "real" thing, it is boundless. where it is most confusing is what happens to the consciousness after ones own inevitable end.

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  3. Similar to Tom, I too was very much confused by the introduction to The Phenomenology of Spirit, when writing my own blog post I found myself asking questions that I thought did not even make sense. However, after reading Brett's post I found myself feeling a bit more comfortable with the ideas (trying to avoid the word concept here since it has a completely DIFFERENT meaning to Hegel) of consciousness and the role it plays in Hegel's explanations. To attempt to answer Brett's final question, "is it correct to say that this is the doing of consciousness if it is something else that is driving consciousness out of its prior state?" I feel compelled to cite something we discussed in class. We said that everything is constant and all objects of knowledge are in relation to other forms or concepts. If we take this idea and apply it to that of the consciousness, it can be logical to assume that even if the consciousness is being driven out by something else, it is all working in relation together. Does that make sense?

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