Sense-certainty: Inevitable mediation

Hegel described sense-certainty as turning into despair. It is phenomenal knowledge, which is related to appearances in the sense that they are illusions. By our lack of knowledge we learn that we were wrong when we actually begin to learn how something or someone really is. Sense-certainty is an empty universal. It is knowledge that you are unable to describe in words which causes this idea to vanish. I see sense- certainty as a never ending road. Even though we determine what an object is through relation and negation to our consciousness we can never desribe it fully which can never actually make us certain of what the truth is about the object. I believe that we can never fully be certain of anything since we base something on what it is not and what we know about it in our own minds a lot of the time and even if we learn how something works or learn more about something there are so many things to consider that we base it on what we believe in our minds/ perceive.

 By inevitable mediation Hegel means that a "here" or "now", which is an object, is a constant movement of moments and is not  immediate knowledge. As Hegel says in paragraph 108, "Rather, since the point is pointed out as existing, the pointing out points to itself as showing itself to be not immediate knowledge but rather a movement from out of the many “here's” which were meant and a movement into the universal “here,” which is a simple plurality of “here's” in the way that the daytime is a simple plurality of “now's”.  This describes inevitable mediation. He is trying to say that for example saying it is night “now” we are pointing it out and that now gets crossed out for the “now” it is after the movement of time. For example, it was six at night when we first pointed out its night, at a different time the last now has been negated by the “now” now.

Sense- certainty leads us to talk about individual things in general instead of actually talking about the specific object is what hegel is trying to say. Hegel uses a great example of a piece of paper. You know what a piece of loose leaf paper is and some can say how it is made but can you really say how that specific one came to be and the truth of everything behind it?. We just start talknig about how paper is made in general but not about the specific paper in front of me. I interpret Hegel believing in what he is saying, we cant fully descibe an object so we can not be certain of the truth behind the object.

Unmediated Knowing In Sense - Certainty

For the chapter on Sense Certainty, it seems that Hegel believes that all sense certainty is mediate knowledge. It's not possible to have any immediate knowledge of an object. From his text, I think I understand why he thinks that but don't feel that it applies to all knowledge. Hegel's main examples are of the "this", "now", "here", and "I". Hegel will say that something is the now but at a different moment that object will be gone and something will take it's place. However both moments are still part of the "now" when sensed. The only thing that remains constant or by how Hegel puts it "Universal" is the actual moment of now.

I agree that we are always living in the "now" and that's the only time we have any sense certainty but I don't get how this applies to certain knowledge. One example I am thinking of is something like freedom. Isn't that a type of knowledge that is always there? Its not something that is an object we can sense normally. Would Hegel totally disregard this because its outside our senses? I wasn't sure how literal he meant sense-certainty. Another example is God. A normal person isn't always "here" but for the definition of God, it's always supposed to be "here". I wonder how Hegel would answer that kind of perspective?

Another thing that I don't really follow is the universality of these terms. For something that's always flowing and changing within it, a term like "this" or "now" doesn't appear to be consistent. In section (99) Hegel refers to the term "here" by saying "To this sense-certainty, since in itself it has proved that the universal is the truth of its object, pure being therefore remains as its essence, but not as immediate" This statement really confuses me because it sounds like that the term "here" is an object. So what makes it universal is the fact that "here" is a space that contains objects within it? To me it would make more sense if this was the case. It would be like having a box that never changes but everything inside it is always changes.

When it comes to sense-certainty as a whole, it almost sounds like Hegel is trying to explain a formula  to me. All these terms are the variables(x and y) and objects are always the result but what they represent is what changes. The point being that x and y are always there. I don't know if that actually applies for other people but the way Hegel writes about these subjects is really cryptic to me and this is my method to trying to understand it.

Hegel's Notions of Truth and Consciousness

According to Hegel’s introduction to Phenomenology of Spirit, this is a question that cannot be so easily answered. We must first examine what is true in order to decipher what is false; they are interconnected in their existence. This idea was introduced in class when we discussed the concept of antithesis, in order to know what something is, is to know what it is not. The way in which he does this is by discussing the absolute and consciousness. In regards to the absolute, as Edward stated in his blog last week, “For Hegel, the Absolute exists as a kind of ultimate unity between life and reality and, more importantly, between the halves of each of the antithesis, such as between intellect and belief.” We will need to keep this definition in mind when discussing the role of consciousness in deciding between what is true and what is false.

As Hegel begins to discuss natural consciousness, he focuses on the idea of “doubt” and how it plays into understanding if knowledge is real or not. He states, “Natural consciousness will prove to be merely the concept of knowledge, that is, prove to be not real knowledge. However, because to a greater degree it immediately takes itself to be real knowledge , this path has a negative meaning for it, and in its eyes the realization of the concept will count to an even greater degree as the loss of itself, for it is on this path that it loses its truth” (37). Despite having read and re-read this section, the question that arises is how does it go about losing itself? Is Hegel stating that because it is on this path of self discovery that it somehow loses truth? Is truth and knowledge mutually exclusive? This is where his ideas of “doubt” start to come into play and where another curve ball is essentially thrown to the reader. As I understood it, doubt plays a significant role in proving the consciousness to be truth because in proving that doubt does not exist we are reassured of his truth. Hegel comes to this conclusion by saying, “In contrast, in directing itself to the entire range of phenomenal consciousness, skepticism makes spirit for the firs time competent to investigate what is the truth, since it manages to elicit a despair about those so-called natural conceptions, thoughts, and opinions” (38).

Taking all this into consideration, is it accurate to say that there are no absolute oppositions (or antithesis) when discussing the validity of consciousness and truth? If proving that something is false also proves that is it true or vice/verse do we lose sight of what the absolute truly is?

More on "What is Enlightenment?"

Hey there, I thought I’d say a few more words about “What is Enlightenment?” since we only spent a single day on it (and also because I just had more to say). I want to thank Norm for this excellent, provocative post on the essay.  He has both clarified the text itself as well as raised important questions, that due to our schedule, I will not be able to answer in class. I am particularly glad that he ventured to answer the question regarding the relation of metaphysics to Enlightenment.

Although there are many great comments here I will for brevity’s sake respond to a couple. Ethan’s clarification is very helpful and amplifies beneficially what I was saying in class on Wednesday. As well, I appreciate John’s comment about Frederick the Great. I strongly agree that Kant’s text is not a polemic—if anything it’s more of a Festschrift, a celebratory writing, devoted to a Frederick (in this respect, Jon P is closer to the truth … Kant does sound a bit sycophantic). For examples of polemics, see his comments on his reviewers in the Appendix to the Prolegomena. But in 18th century Prussia, no one raises polemics against the king.

Metaphysics and Enlightenment

First, we must remember that Kant in the Prolegomena asks after the possibility of metaphysics as a science.  He has strict rules for what a science is and despite his passionate devotion to metaphysics, he applies them carefully and without immoderate generosity. But public discourse cannot satisfy those rules, of establishing a foundation that is “permanent” and “complete” because the concerns of public discourse are not scientific. They concern matters of public concern that are revisable, civil laws and practices—but for metaphysics to be a science, it cannot be revisable.

Second, the ends of Enlightenment and philosophy as metaphysics are different. Metaphysics needs to be established as a science, whereas Enlightenment takes its aim as the liberation of individuals’ reason from the hegemony of institutions.

Writing and Civil Law

This is the most interesting issue, namely, the unique status of writing in relation to civil law. First, there is the perplexing fact that Kant simply identifies writing with intellectual freedom. This seems contrary to fact, in that in Prussia (at least after Frederick the Great and likely before him, if not during his rule) texts were always submitted to a censor before publication. Thus, far from intellectual freedom, writing seems to be the place in which certain constraints are placed on intellectual life. This is also contrary to tradition, in that philosophical history consistently derogated writing as a “dead” representation of thought, as Plato put it in the Phaedrus. Thus, reason would seem not constrained in this perspective, but neutralized.

Second, intellectual freedom is most extended where civil freedoms are curtailed. What Kant means by this is that where human action is more limited, the mind can act more freely. It may appear as if he is saying the opposite of this, but a closer examination reveals otherwise.

“A high degree of civil freedom seems advantageous to a people’s intellectual freedom, yet it also sets up insuperable barriers to it. Conversely, a lesser degree of civil freedom gives intellectual freedom the room to expand to its full extent” (59). It seems like the greater the field of human action, intellectual freedom would equally benefit. Yet some “insuperable barriers” are erected, and intellectual freedom is actually liberated more though a more limited sphere of human action. What these “insuperable barriers” are, I will not speculate here. The question is, how do limits on public action benefit literary culture and intellectual freedom?  Where the actions of bodies and individuals are most closely circumscribed, the mind gains a freedom from its guidance of the former?

Third, why does public speech, not writing, threaten civil peace? Freedom of speech is allowed, only insofar as individuals are publishing themselves, rather than vocalizing themselves. The sphere of public reason is delimited, as I indicated above. Johann the Blacksmith and Gottfried the Miller are not privy to the discourse of “scholars.” Since they may well be illiterate, does public reason, when vocalized, provoke the illiterate to disrupt civil law?  Whereas “scholars” can respect the space of writing, in which thoughts are expressed without immediate civil consequences? Is spoken public reason (if this were possible) closer to civil action than written public reason?

Hegel's, "The Need of Philosophy"

For Hegel, the need for philosophy (though not philosophy itself) arises as a contingent from what he calls the, “harmony that has been rent” (40). This destroyed harmony is referred throughout the piece as the dichotomy between what Hegel calls the Absolute and the “appearance of the Absolute” (40). It is man’s intellect and its suppression and/or misappropriation of Reason that causes this dichotomy to appear. In particular, it is intellect’s insistence on the fixed that interferes with the unfixed and infinite portions of what Hegel refers to as the “antitheses,” i.e., “spirit and matter, soul and body, faith and intellect, freedom and necessity, etc.” (41). In the place of these traditional antitheses appears new antitheses, such as, “Reason and sensibility,” and, “absolute subjectivity and absolute objectivity” (41). In fact, the nature of intellect itself could be considered another such antithesis, if one considers that intellect has an ever expanding purview in the interest of linking the Absolute to human experience, creating an ever more complex manifold in an attempt to gain an understanding of the Absolute (40). It is the fixing of these antitheses and, in particular, the moving away from the older generation of them, that produces Reason’s need of philosophy.

In order to better understand Hegel’s task, we should closely examine what he means by the Absolute. An early reference is made to the fixation of the Absolute into appearance and, in this manner, one may immediately think of the distinction made by Kant between things in themselves and appearance. It would be a mistake, however, to stop there as Kant further separates appearance from illusion and Hegel does not appear to do the same. For Hegel, the Absolute exists as a kind of ultimate unity between life and reality and, more importantly, between the halves of each of the antithesis, such as between intellect and belief. Life, itself, is a product of both unity and fission and it “eternally forms itself by setting up oppositions” (41). To understand the nature of the Absolute is to understand that these seemingly contradictory concepts can and must coexist.

As one becomes able to move beyond thinking of these halves in a fixed nature, as intellect would have us often do, culture and society can begin to deconstruct intellect’s ever expanding and solidifying manifold and see the complementary nature of the apparent contradictions of each antithesis. This presents us with a question. Does the solving of this dichotomy eliminate the need of philosophy? Or will it continue in some fashion, finding for itself a new reason for being?

An Answer to the Question: "What is Enlightenment"... and How it Might Relate to Kant's Views on Metaphysics and Religion.

In the present essay, Kant describes the age in which he lives as "an age of enlightenment". It is one in which individuals are learning to use their faculty of reason to make decisions involving religion, morality, ethics and good government... without relying on so-called "experts" to provide them with answers. Kant labels the latter condition as one of "immaturity", and defines it as "the inability to use one's own understanding without the guidance of another" [page 54].

Kant's essay is best viewed as a polemic, directed at his king and others in authority, arguing as he does that while private use of reason can and often should be restricted, public use of reason must always be given free rein... if the goal of those in authority is that society achieve its highest potential [page 55]. By "public use of reason", Kant means that process by which the thoughts and views of learned and informed individuals are promulgated throughout society by means of scholarly writings and public discourse. He terms "private use of reason" that which a person might employ in carrying out his duties within a particular post or office to which he has been entrusted [last line, page 55].

Kant believes that any suppression of public free thinking must, inevitably, have a detrimental and pernicious effect on society by keeping it, at best, in a state of "immaturity" and, at worst, in a state of "barbarism". And Kant adds that "matters of religion" represent the most critical sphere in which public use of reason and individual free thought must be given free rein [page 59].

How do these admonitions of Kant relate to his views on metaphysics, as elaborated in his Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics ?... And, in particular, how can its sub-discipline, religion, have the potential to become a more "enlightened" field of inquiry and endeavor over time? For Kant's present essay on "Enlightenment" to make any sense at all, vis-à-vis the possibility of there being "enlightenment in religion", it is necessary to assume that at least one of the following must be true:

A. That metaphysics, insofar as spiritual and religious matters are concerned, is a science that can make progress and become "more enlightened" over time by adding to its store of "a priori synthetic knowledge", brought about by public use of reason in scholarly discourse.

B. That human happiness and societal contentment will be enhanced through "more enlightened" forms of religious belief and practice, and will be diminished through "less enlightened forms"... and that, over time, through free public discourse based on public use of reason, the better forms of religious belief and practice will become predominant, allowing religious belief to make progress as a "social science".

C. That since "absolute truth" with respect to proper religious belief and practice can never be known, given the limits of metaphysical inquiry, the free exchange of ideas regarding religion by means of public use of reason, nonetheless, represents a desirable "end in itself"... always preferable to the maintenance of a fixed, unquestionable body of religious dogmatism. One might ask, though, whether this last position is inherently obvious... or needs to be supported by means of logically sound arguments.

In conclusion, it is noteworthy that aside from drawing the distinction between public and private uses of reason, Kant notes that, unlike in the case of public use of reason... private use of reason must often be curtailed. He states that, "a lesser degree of civil freedom gives intellectual freedom enough room to expand to its fullest content" [page 59]. In other words, one must often do one's duty as an agent of society and, in so doing, further an idea or enterprise that is in direct opposition to one's own standards of sound logic and reasonableness. For example, the editor of a newspaper or scholarly journal might have an obligation to print a well-framed article, even though he might believe that the contents of the article are false and counter-productive. By curbing his own private use of reason and allowing the article to be published, he allows the general public to see the contents and decide for itself... thereby allowing public use of reason to have its largest audience and its greatest impact.

Responding to critics: Prolegomena, Appendix

          In the appendix of the Prolegomina, Kant takes the chance to respond to some criticism thrown his way by the philosophers of his time. In the introduction, he is quick to make the distinction between two kinds of judgments on The Critique of Pure Reason; those that precede investigation, and those that come after the investigation. The focus of his response then becomes on the critique of one particular author, a Christian Garve, placing him in the category of authors who made the judgment preceding investigation. “He appears not at all to see what really mattered in the investigation with which I have occupied myself (p.124)”. Kant then continues to defend himself against his opponent’s view of him as a “transcendental idealist (p.125)” in a similar condescending manner for the rest of the response, which eventually leads him to the point he was trying to make: What can we do in order to make metaphysics as a science actual?

        

        Kant uses the criticism from Garve to point out its fallacy and incompetence in the sense that, unlike The Critique of Pure Reason, it does not even attempt to make a better case for metaphysics as a science. “The endeavors of all speculative philosophy now stand at the point of total dissolution, although human reason clings to them with undying (and betrayed) affection (p.131)”. His hope is that the Critique will at least be in some way helpful to the masses, that may come together in order analyze his work and re-examine the foundation upon which metaphysics stands at the time, “a system would thereby come into being that could become a legacy to posterity for which it would have reason to be thankful”. It seems as though Kant thinks he came up with the ultimate introduction tool, at the very least, to any system for metaphysics. On the one hand, he does pose some necessary questions for reason as being a priori, and the specific way one can approach the unfilled space of metaphysics in science, but is this a good defense for metaphysics or just an attempt to salvage his taken approach to it and the extensive arguments in the Critique? Are protection against “judgment(s) of dogmatic speculation (p.134)” and the search for the elementary concepts of the pure understanding strong enough rhetoric on his part to sway the criticisms from others in his favor?

      

       Kant takes on an arrogant tone in response to his criticisms from others, but is this tone justified by his work? Did the Prolegomina withstand the test of time as a system for metaphysics as Kant would have hoped?