The motivating force behind Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and of his transcendental philosophy is the question, “Is metaphysics possible at all?” This question can also be understood as, Is metaphysics as a science possible? That is, a metaphysics that is universal, systematic and generative.
Kant begins the “General Question of the Prolegomena” section by assessing the “problem” of metaphysics thus far. He points to the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments to explain why metaphysics has not yet reached the level of science. Within metaphysics, the only propositions that are certain and indisputable are analytic--statements in which the predicate asserts what is inherently present in the concept of the subject. But since analytic propositions are merely explicative, they cannot serve to expand knowledge, which is the ultimate goal of metaphysics. On the other hand, although philosophers have used synthetic propositions throughout history, Kant asserts that nobody has yet proven them from reason a priori which results in unfounded assertions and contradictions and “thereby metaphysics has itself destroyed its claim to lasting approbation” (24-25).
In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant approaches the question (Is metaphysics possible?) synthetically but within pure reason by seeking the elements of pure reason as well as the laws of its “pure use” (25). The Prolegomena, however, serves as preparation for the science of pure reason. Here, Kant uses an analytic procedure in order to show “what needs to be done in order to bring a science into existence if possible” (25). Essentially, he seeks to illuminate and make concrete what is already known in order to form the foundation from which future metaphysics can ascend.
Although we cannot yet assume the existence of metaphysics as a science to be valid, we do have examples of pure synthetic cognition a priori within mathematics and natural science. If we ultimate want to answer the question “Is metaphysics as a science possible?” Kant argues that we must examine synthetic cognition a priori. Since we know that such cognition is possible we must assess how it is possible within mathematics and natural science in order to establish the possibility of synthetic cognition a priori in metaphysics.
Prolegomena General Question: How is cognition from pure reason possible?
The reason for asking how cognition from pure reason is possible is to determine:
1. The principles of its possibility
2. The conditions of its use
3. The boundaries of pure reason
In the preamble, Kant distinguishes between “judgments belonging to metaphysics” and “properly metaphysical judgments” (21) by stating that judgments belonging to metaphysics are mostly analytic while properly metaphysical judgments are always synthetic. In a similar vein, he reserves the phrase “cognition from pure reason” only for synthetic cognition a priori.
Kant admits that cognition from pure reason (or synthetic cognition a priori) seems counter-intuitive. After all, how can one say anything is necessary of something unless it is part of its definition? While Kant credits David Hume for interrupting his “dogmatic slumber” (10), Kant radically disagrees with Hume’s conclusion that only experience can account for causality. He defines “transcendental philosophy” as the “complete solution” to the question: “How is pure reason possible?” (20). Furthermore, he insists that while transcendental philosophy is part of metaphysics, it seeks to establish the possibility of metaphysics and therefore must come before all metaphysics.
As Esther mentioned in her comprehensive analysis of Kant’s quest to answer “Is metaphysics as a science possible,” Kant’s primary step is to understand how pure natural science and mathematics is possible. I found Kant’s analysis of pure natural science very enlightening and furthermore showing his craftiness and uniqueness in comparison to his predecessors. In order to understand how pure science is possible, Kant contrasts subjective and objective validity, concluding that object validity is something universal and necessary, in other words, could not have contingency or have happened otherwise. Objective validity applies to synthetic apriori judgments including mathematics, natural science and metaphysics. Hume disagreed with this objectivity, only conceiving of a probability that a causal relationship will occur. Hume’s metaphysical theory is based on subjective validity – founded in aposteriori experience and mere probability that a causal relationship will occur. By positing objective validity, which is not based on experience but produces experience, Kant can posit a systematic type of knowledge based on experience – how we really know things in experience. For example, Kant argues that the natural laws imply some universality and are necessary, based on pure concepts of the understanding. By arguing that natural science, like mathematics, has lawfulness (objective validity), Kant is able to do away with skepticism, which characterizes Berkeley and Hume’s conceptions.
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