In the A and B Prefaces to the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant lights on different emphases in explaining the mission of the Critique. These different emphases demonstrate how Kant has changed his conception of the purpose of the Critique, in the years between the first edition of 1781 and the second of 1787.
In the 1781 A Preface, Kant focuses on the promise of possibility of metaphysics. As he writes, the critique sets out to determine the possibility of “cognitions after which reason might strive independently of all experience, and hence the decision about the possibility or impossibility of metaphysics in general” (Critique of Pure Reason, 101). Here metaphysics denotes knowledge of the traditional metaphysical objects, such as God, freedom and soul, none of which are manifest within experience. What is more, the question of the possibility of metaphysics is open, undetermined. Although we presume Kant composed the Preface after he had completed the Critique, he holds out for its possibility. Yet in the Critique, he will sharply restricts the speculative function of reason, and he indicates as much later in the Preface when he says of those objects transcending experience that he must “admit that this wholly surpasses my capacity” (102). So what then does he think that metaphysics is? We ask this question because it seems that he is saying that metaphysics is something other than the knowledge of these objects beyond experience. The answer seems to be suggested in the beginning of the A Preface, in which he describes the dialectical destiny of reason—its “peculiar fate.”
The 1787 B Preface, by contrast, seems oriented towards different matters, particularly, in the question of the positive and negative consequences of the Critique (Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics, 148). The question is, is the Critique merely negative in its restriction of speculative reason? Kant thinks resolutely not. Conversely, this is a positive effect, as he famously explains: “I therefore had to cast out knowledge in order to make room for belief” (150). In this respect, something completely new enters the orbit of the problem of reason’s critique (relative to the description of the A Preface), namely, that the critique and limitation of the speculative or theoretical function of reason complements, nay, makes possible, the extension of practical philosophy. In brief, only if reason is limited in its knowledge of God, soul or freedom—in which matters it always otherwise remains in contradiction—can it hold out for the possibility of a moral belief in the existence of these unknowable objects. Belief is only possible if knowledge is limited.
Thus, between these Prefaces something dramatic has occurred. The conclusions of the Critique remain largely the same. But the meaning of those conclusions has been transformed. In the A Preface, Kant metaphysics concerns the contradictions reason inevitably finds itself in. In the B Preface, metaphysics or speculative reason is to be limited for the sake of practical philosophy. What is the connection between these internal rational contradictions and the aspirations of practical philosophy?
Kant’s B Preface to the Critique of Pure Reason, published one year before his Critique of Practical Reason, reflects his greater concern for practical philosophy since the release of the Prolegomena in 1781. Since the metaphysical exploration is undeniably intertwined in morality and ethics, for example encompassing God and Freedom (Prolegomena, 150), Kant must qualify that deterministic laws or objective knowledge set out by science can undermine moral beliefs such as Freedom, which he states may be natural features of our rational selves. In Kant’s A Preface, I was intrigued by his footnote that religion must also submit to criticism and be “able to withstand free and public examination” (Critique of Pure Reason, 101). We do begin to see the relationship between theoretical and practical philosophy in the A Preface, especially in the justification of his pursuit of speculative reason. In the Critique of Practical Reason (1788), Kant argues that religious beliefs must preserve the rationality of moral action – echoing the basis of his metaphysical pursuit in opposition to dogmatism in both the A and B Prefaces.
ReplyDeleteIt is interesting to point out Kant’s use of the word opinion in the A Preface, stating that there is no room for opinions when using pure reason (Critique of Pure Reason, 102). Ironically, Kant presents many of his theories in Preface A as his immodest opinions by stating them in the first person: “I flatter myself that … I have succeeded in removing all those errors that have so far put reason into dissention with itself in its nonexperiential use” (101); “I make bold to say that there cannot be a single metaphysical problem has not been solved here” (101). He even anticipates possible criticism from the reader perceiving his Critique as pretentious and asks that the reader work hard to understand his Critique as it is “a great and important piece of work … in a complete and lasting way” (104). These boastful claims and Kant’s concern about the reader’s perception of the Critique create a defensive tone to the A Preface that works to undermine his own supposed confidence, especially when combined with Kant’s statement about the limits of his work as it pertains to understanding objects transcending experience (freedom, God),
ReplyDeleteIn the B Preface, Kant not only provides clarification concerning the negative and positive consequences of the Critique to include the concept of belief concerning objects transcending experience, but he also removes most of his first-person statements of opinion and writes in a much more factual manner. He mostly abstains from offering his opinion concerning the importance of the Critique and is much more modest when doing so. For example, in regards to the Critique’s application to God, freedom, and immortality, Kant chooses to state its importance in the negative by saying that it “is not to be deemed insignificant” (Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics, 150).
The aspirations of practical philosophy to discover what is moral and create an ethical framework for human behavior is very connected to the internal rational contradictions Kant touches upon in Preface A. Before Kant many scholastic and Greek philosophers relied on the idea of a higher power (i.e. God) as a basis for proper moral and ethical conduct. However, under Kant’s presentation of the framework by which metaphysics can be a science, the existence of God is unable to be proven. Belief in God, freedom, and the soul are left to faith. Therefore, the creation of a framework for proper ethical and moral conduct must be left to reason alone. Is Kant’s metaphysics concerned with the discovery of such a framework?
ReplyDeleteKant’s restriction of speculative reason leaves room for causality and determinism to peacefully coexist with freedom. When the constraints placed upon speculative reason, to allow for belief in something such as free will, there is no reason that we cannot have both A causes B and A causes B unless interrupted by C, where C is a new causal force that is itself uncaused, having come into being through the free choice/will of its owner. The question may then become: “If reason cannot grant us knowledge of freedom, God, and soul, what can?” It would seem to indicate that there is another function of the human mind that we have either yet to discover or have otherwise been restricted from accessing.
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ReplyDeleteOn the connection between internal contradictions and aspirations of practical philosophy:
ReplyDeleteSince our internal, apriori concepts structure objects, or in other words, since our apriori concepts organize the things in the world to the way as it appears to us, these appearances (experience) are all that we can ever know, thus it makes no sense to speak of knowledge of things in themselves beyond experience. This is where Kant draws the limits on what can be known, and the implication is if we cannot have knowledge beyond that which is within the scope of experience (which is organized by apriori concepts), then what sense is there to reason about that which is beyond experience?
However, far from limiting the scope of knowledge, by reining in reason’s capacity to answer questions about freedom/soul/God and other objects that transcends experience, one turns towards a new way of knowing which is beyond pure speculative/theoretical reasoning; speculative reasoning has the tendency to lead to internal contradiction, such as the contradiction between the concept of freedom and the concept of causality, so when Kant reveals the limit of the scope of reason, which previously ventured into inquiries of things beyond our experiences, new ways of understanding opens up (practical reasoning).
In your blog you wrote that the difference between Kat’s prefaces A and B – other than the gap time of first appearance - is that in preface A Kant expresses what is known of objects, such as God, Freedom, and Soul. My question to you is, if Kant really saw the terms of God, Freedom and Soul as objects rather than something else as maybe substance? With the terms objects it seems to me a contradiction as objects is inferred to be experienced in the world as they are outside our mind where as God, Freedom, and Soul cannot be touched or seen (by a normal person).
ReplyDeleteI would think that the connection between speculative reason and practical philosophy, according to Kant is to synthesize reason experienced with inner intuition, what he calls synthetic a priori judgments) and hence his theory of transcendental philosophy.
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ReplyDeleteWhen Kant talks about the "peculiar fate" of reason in Preface A he does point out that there are most certainly limitations to what one can know within the realm of reason. It seems that reason is at odds with knowledge, particularly that it is simply a method of organization of all things to be known, yet this same method points out that there are things beyond reason that simply must be accepted as truth, in faith.
ReplyDeleteWith this in mind, preface B complements and further enforces the argument that moral and ethical philosophy is primarily made possible by the absence of absolute knowledge of God, freedom, and the soul. Speculation on these matters outside experience and a priori judgements leaves the room for a practical approach. Kant approaches the critique of pure reason in a way that lets him build a foundation first, which he feels has not been adequately questioned or critiqued in the same fashion before.
Kant’s notion of reason having a “peculiar fate” in the A Preface originates from his belief at the time that reason has the tendency to ask questions beyond its capacity to answer. In other words, reason alone can achieve no progress. However, Kant seems to have found an answer in which reason can escape its “fate” of contradiction, which he presents in the B Preface. In order for reason to make sense, it must collaborate with the empirical school of thought. While the very first step of attaining truth is the “concept”, the confirmation of its truth-value comes from experimentation (Critique of Pure Reason, 142) - in other words, experience confirms whether one’s initial ideas are true or mere misconceptions. However, Kant’s new idea seems to come with difficulties as well. Experiments are restricted solely to the physical world and thusly, whatever truths concluded are only truths in regards to the material world. How then, can one explain metaphysical concepts such as God, free will, etc.? Has Kant completely forsaken such concepts and has therefore claimed such ideas to be without explanation? However, to make such a decision would be claiming metaphysics as impossibility because metaphysics is in regards to the non-physical and Kant’s model of reason working with experiments in the B Preface is a restricted idea to the physical. After all that have been said, it still seems that there has been not much progress.
ReplyDeleteIn my opinion, the primary difference between Preface A and Preface B is the tone with which Kant introduces his objectives in Critique of Pure Reason, rather than the meaning or consequence of those objectives. Preface A, for all its attempts at humility, comes off as an attack on all the sacred institutions of metaphysics (religion and religious concepts), while Preface B reads almost as an apologetic at times—particularly, as you pointed out, by highlighting the positive aspects of metaphysics that Critique opens up. It seems that, between the two Prefaces, Kant felt that, despite his pleas to the contrary, his readers were approaching his work in with wrong frame of mind—namely, that his objectives were negative. The connection between the two Prefaces’ foci, to answer your question, is that they are the same. It seems to me that Kant, in Preface B, merely wishes to make it clear that his (Preface A) conclusion about internal rational contradictions being present in metaphysics does not constitute an attack, but rather a new beginning, a positive contribution to the field.
ReplyDeleteKant is addressing the theory of metaphysics as a science; to find reason in objects that are a priori. In the A preface he is rather arrogant and aggressive in his approach. This differs greatly when we delve into Preface B. His delivery seems to come from a more "rational" place and his journey to solve the contradictions he faced in Preface A reigns some clarity. Kant explains "I therefore had to cast out knowledge in order to make room for belief." If I am understanding Kant correctly, essentially his reasoning is allowing us to not apply such severe rules on objects that are beyond experience which brings to the table - practical philosophy.
ReplyDeletePreface A focuses on Kant's ideas of metaphysics possibly being a science. With Kant's questioning whether metaphysics could be a science, rejecting the previous concept of metaphysics solemnly being about God, freedom, and the soul. This is an aggressive tone in comparison to Preface B in which Kant is assertive in finding "a new beginning" for metaphysics. His refined perspective in Preface B reflects his new idea that metaphysics cannot only be about beyond experience.
ReplyDeleteI strongly agree that "Belief is only possible if knowledge is limited". Using religion as an example, ask yourself why so many religions exist. In fact there is not enough knowledge about how humankind came to exist and therefore religion and also science try to explain this phenomena.
In the A preface, Kant is concerned with setting up metaphysics as a science, but it is questionable whether or not it is possible. In his B preface, he makes the claim that a science must have a set criteria and have the ability to progress in knowledge. However, in his A preface he defines metaphysics as the "battlefield" of controversies we face when we seek answers in principles beyond experience. However, Kant also states that "there cannot be a single metaphysical problem that has not been solved here, or at least to the solution of which the key has not been provided" (Critique of Pure Reason, 101). For this to be the case, metaphysics as a science cannot exist. If the solutions are all provided, it cannot progress in knowledge and therefore fails Kant's definition of a science that he sets up in the B preface.
ReplyDeleteIn Preface A Kant uses metaphyics just as an artist uses a broad stroke to cover everything. He attempts to qualify metaphysics as a viable science to explain non-physical objects, for example God, freedom, and soul without the use of deductive reasoning or experience. In Preface B he takes a step back and looks at the problem in a smaller more encapsulated way. Using the artificial boundaries of "reason" to explain what it is a moral belief or possibility of the existence of a superior being and a soul.
ReplyDeleteBased on evidence or lack thereof we see in both Prefaces the more reasonable belief is based on the notion that we have already stripped down as far as we could the belief in its smallest parts. More in Preface B than A but to the same conclusion more or less. Metaphysics he claims is a science of thought that follows very different rules. Where Natural Science uses cause and effect, metaphysics uses theory not based on experience and cannot be tested or proven based on it nature of being not actually having form, only ideas.
I agree that Kant is making promises of Metaphysics in Preface A. He seems to be going back and forth on how metaphysics can and cannot exist. Metaphysics is the knowledge of things beyond experience. Knowledge is derived from our own experiences, so we cant actually have knowledge of something without experiencing it. We can only speculate what god is or what a soul is and/or looks like. The connection between these rational contradictions and aspirations of practical philosophy is speculative reasoning. Metaphysics causes increases in rational contradictions and limiting it can bring about a practical philosophy but speculative reasoning is needed to come out with newer ideas instead of staying with the same mentality and not progressing. That is how Metaphysics is a science; it can cause progress of the thinking in a human mind. Then again we will never have a concrete knowledge on things such as god, and souls if we will never experience them.
ReplyDeleteIn preface A, Kant mentions how a true science is one that moves forward without many steps back, in other words that errors are few in a true science. And yet if knowledge can only come from experience and any knowledge of a thing beyond experience is metaphysics, won't it then be impossible to know when one has made an error and needs to revise the knowledge of the thing? And if it is impossible to know if an error in metaphysics can be made doesn't it then mean that no errors can be made, and that then metaphysics must be a true science. this somehow doesn't make sense to me.
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